Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

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Summarized Fatawaa

Is it permissible to slaughter a sheep on Eid al-Adha with the intention of charity (sadaqah) on behalf of a sick person, and with the intention of udhiyah (sacrificial animal) at the same time?

Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our Master, the Messenger of Allah.
 
The udhiyah (sacrificial animal) is an act of worship intended for its own sake; therefore, it must be slaughtered with the intention (niyyah) of udhiyah.
 
Whoever intends to draw closer to Allah through this act of obedience with the intention of udhiyah, and also intends to gift the reward to another person, there is no Islamic objection to that. And Allah Almighty knows best.

What is the Islamic ruling on the aqiqa?

All praise is due to Allah, and may peace and blessings be upon our Master, the Messenger of Allah.
The 'aqīqah is a confirmed Sunnah (sunnah mu'akkadah). Two sheep are to be slaughtered for a newborn boy, and one sheep for a newborn girl. This is established by numerous Prophetic traditions, among them:
The narration of Samurah ibn Jundub, may Allah be pleased with him, who reported that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "Every child is held in pledge for his 'aqīqah, which is slaughtered on his behalf on the seventh day, and he is named, and his head is shaved." — Narrated by al-Tirmidhī, who graded it as ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ.
And the narration of 'Ā'ishah, may Allah be pleased with her, who said: "The Messenger of Allah ﷺ commanded us to slaughter one sheep as 'aqīqah for a girl, and two sheep for a boy." — Narrated by Aḥmad and Ibn Mājah.
The imperative in these narrations is understood to denote recommendation rather than obligation, based on the ḥadīth of 'Amr ibn Shu'ayb, on the authority of his father, on the authority of his grandfather, who said: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ was asked about the 'aqīqah, whereupon he said: "Allah does not love 'uqūq" — as though he disliked the name itself — and then said: "Whoever has a child born to him and wishes to offer a sacrifice on their behalf, let them do so: two equivalent sheep for a boy, and one sheep for a girl." — Narrated by Aḥmad and Abū Dāwūd.
The legal inference drawn from this narration is that the Prophet ﷺ linked the slaughter to the wish and willingness of the individual, saying: "whoever wishes to offer a sacrifice... let them do so" — thereby indicating that the 'aqīqah is recommended (mustaḥabb) and not obligatory (wājib).
And Allah Almighty knows best.

Is it permissible to offer an Udhiyah on behalf of the deceased?

In the Name of Allah, and may peace and blessings be upon our Master, the Messenger of Allah.
 
Offering an Udhiyah (sacrificial animal) on behalf of a deceased person is permissible. This is the official position of the Hanbali school (as stated in Kashshaf al-Qina’ by al-Bahuti,Vol.6/P.428) and was also upheld by the prominent Shafi'i scholar Al-’Abbadi (mentioned in Bidayat al-Muhtaj by Ibn Qadi Shuhbah,Vol. 4/P.358). It has likewise been narrated as a valid view among some Maliki and Hanafi scholars.
 
In fact, Imam Abu Dawud dedicated an entire chapter in his Sunan collection entitled, "Chapter on Sacrificing on Behalf of the Deceased." In it, he recorded a narration from Hanash, who said: "I saw 'Ali sacrificing two rams, so I asked him, 'What is this?' He replied, 'The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) commanded me to offer a sacrifice on his behalf, so I am sacrificing on his behalf.'"
 
Imam Abu Dawud also narrated from Jabir (may Allah be pleased with him) that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "O Allah, this is from You, for You, and on behalf of Muhammad and his Ummah (community). In the Name of Allah, and Allah is the Greatest," and he then slaughtered the animal.
 
The textual evidence here lies in the fact that our Master, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), offered a sacrifice on behalf of his entire community—and it is well-established that his community includes those who have already passed away.
 
Furthermore, there is an abundance of sacred texts demonstrating that the rewards of righteous deeds reach the deceased. For instance, it is permissible to fast on behalf of a deceased person who passed away with missed obligatory fasts, and it is equally permissible to perform Hajj on their behalf, both of which are firmly established in authentic Hadiths. Therefore, if the reward of fasting (which is a purely physical act of worship) and Hajj (which is a joint physical and financial act of worship) can reach the deceased, then the reward of an Udhiyah reaches them with greater reason (by way of A Fortiori argument). This is because it is a purely financial act of worship, falling under the general category of charity (Sadaqah).
 
Additionally, scholars have reached a consensus (Ijma') that the rewards of charity reach the deceased, and since the Udhiyah is inherently an act of charity, it falls under the same ruling. Consequently, based on all the aforementioned evidence, we hold the view that offering a sacrifice on behalf of the deceased is entirely permissible. And Allah the Almighty Knows Best.

Is fasting obligatory for a child?

Fasting is not obligatory for a child until they reach puberty. Puberty is determined by well-known signs, the most common of which are: nocturnal emission (for both males and females), menstruation (for females), or reaching the age of fifteen lunar years.
A guardian must instruct their children to fast once they reach the age of discernment, which is around seven years old, if they are capable of fasting.