Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

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Summarized Fatawaa

What is the ruling of Islamic Law on compensating the patient in case of medical error on the part of the treating physician?

 
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
 
The foundational principle is that every mistake issued by a physician that causes harm to another due to his negligence or lack of expertise obligates him to guarantee liability and compensate the harmed party. The Sharia maxim, in this regard, states: "The direct actor is liable."
 
Ibn Qudamah (may Allah have mercy on him) says: "As for if he was skilled but his hand committed an error—such as exceeding the proper limit of incision, cutting in an incorrect site, cutting with an instrument that inflicts excessive pain, or cutting at an unsuitable time—he is liable, because it is destruction (Itlaf) whose liability does not differ between intent and mistake, thus resembling the destruction of property; and because it is a prohibited act, so he guarantees liability for its secondary effects." [Al-Mughni].
 
However, if the physician performed what was necessary in the most complete manner and took all measures of care and caution, but complications occurred that could not be avoided according to specialists, then no liability rests upon him.
 
Shaykh al-Islam Imam al-Nawawi (may Allah have mercy on him) says: "The cupper and the circumciser bear no liability if they have not been negligent, and likewise the veterinarian if he bleeds an animal and it perishes." [Rawdat al-Talibin].
 
Al-Khattabi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "I know of no disagreement that if the practitioner transgresses and the patient perishes, he is liable. Anyone who undertakes knowledge or practice he does not know is a transgressor; so if perishing arises from his action, he is liable for the blood-money (Diyah) while capital retaliation (Qisas) is dropped from him, because he did not act independently without the patient's permission. And the physician’s offense in the view of the generality of jurists is borne by his agnates ('Aqilah*)."* [Ma'alim al-Sunan].
 
If negligence or transgression is established against the physician, it is necessary to compensate the patient or seek forgiveness from him. And Allah Almighty knows best.

What is the ruling on combining more than one intention in the prayer, such as combining the *sunnah* of wuḍūʾ with the pre-Dhuhr *sunnah*, or combining the *sunnah* of greeting the mosque (*taḥiyyat al-masjid*) with the pre-Dhuhr *sunnah*?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
Combining two intentions in a single act of worship, which some jurists call the “overlapping of acts of worship”, has several cases and precise rules. These can be consulted in the books of legal maxims, such as al-Manthūr fī al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyyah by al-Zarkashī and al-Ashbāh wa’l-Naẓāʾir by al-Suyūṭī. Among the most important of these rules:
First: If all of the acts of worship that one wishes to combine under one intention are obligatory, the intentions do not overlap. An example is combining the intention of the obligatory ʿAṣr prayer with that of the obligatory Dhuhr prayer. The intentions do not overlap in this case.
Second: If the two acts are specified supererogatory prayers (nawāfil muqayyadah) that are aimed at in themselves because of a particular time, occasion, or cause, or if they are an obligatory prayer and a specified supererogatory prayer, the intentions again do not overlap. An example is the Duha prayer, which may not be combined with, for instance, the regular sunnah of Dhuhr.
It is stated in Bushrā al-Karīm: “Whatever is not, in meaning, an absolute voluntary prayer, such as the Duha sunnah… is not subsumed under another. Rather, if he intends something else along with it… the prayer is not validly entered. This is because combining two obligations, two specified supererogatory prayers, or an obligation and a specified supererogatory prayer invalidates the prayer in cases not built upon overlapping, as ritual purification (ṭahārah) is.”
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Are the mother's maternal and paternal uncles, and the father's maternal and paternal uncles, considered among the unmarriageable kin (Maharim)?

Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our Master, the Messenger of Allah.
 
A mother’s maternal uncle and her paternal uncle, as well as a father’s maternal uncle and his paternal uncle, are all considered among the unmarriageable kin (Maharim). And Allah the Exalted knows best.

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