Articles

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah)
Author : Dr.Mosa Al-Zaa'tra
Date Added : 31-08-2025

The Difference between Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) in Jordanian Personal Status Law

 

Marriage (Nikāḥ) and Reinstatement (Rujʿah) are two Islamic terms addressed in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. They differ in both form and ruling where each has its own set of conditions and corresponding juridical rulings within Islamic law.

As defined by the Jordanian Personal Status Law, Nikāḥ is: "A contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully permissible to him, for the purpose of forming a family and producing offspring." The marriage contract requires an offer (Ijāb) and acceptance (Qabūl) between the two parties, and the presence of witnesses is obligatory, as it entails legal and Sharia-based rights and duties related to the family, such as the rights of the wife and husband, establishment of lineage, the prohibition due to marital relations, inheritance, and others.

On the other hand, Rujʿah refers to the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce (Talāq Rajʿī), without the need for a new contract.

Rujʿah provides an opportunity for the couple to reconcile and return to married life. It involves a waiting period known as the ʿIddah (waiting period after divorce). During this period, the couple remains bound by the marriage contract. If they decide to reunite before the end of the waiting period, married life can resume, reducing the number of divorces available to the husband as prescribed by Islamic law.

First: Definition of Rujʿah

A. Linguistically: The term Rujʿah is derived from Arjaʿa or Yurjiʿu, meaning "to return" or "to restore." The verb is transitive, and the object is Marjūʿ (restored) [1].

When a couple "Tarājaʿā," it means they returned to married life after divorce. Allah The Almighty Says (What means): "So if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her, there is no blame upon them for returning to each other." [Al-Baqarah/230].

B. Technically (in Islamic Jurisprudence):

Ḥanafīs define it as: "Rujʿah is the act of taking her back with the intention of retaining [the marriage]."[3].

Mālikīs define it as: "The return of the divorced woman to the marital authority without renewing the contract."[4].

Shāfiʿīs define it as: "Returning the woman to the marriage after a non-final divorce during the waiting period, in a specific manner."[5].

Ḥanbalīs define it as: "Reinstating a non-finally divorced woman to her previous status without a new contract."[6].

C. Definition in Law:

The Jordanian Personal Status Law defines it in Article (98):

"The husband has the right to reinstate his (revocable divorced wife) during the waiting period by word or action. This right is not forfeited by waiver, and reinstatement does not depend on the wife’s consent. No new dowry (Mahr) is required for it."

There is a legal distinction between the two terms in the Personal Status Law regarding guardianship, witnesses, consent, and formulation.

Second: Key Differences between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah

A. Regarding Guardianship (Wilāyah):

In Nikāḥ: A guardian is required, and he must be sane, mature, and Muslim if the bride is Muslim, as stated in Article (15) [7]. In Rujʿah: No guardian is required at all.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (16), the consent of one guardian regarding the suitor overrules the objections of others if they are of equal degree. The consent of a more distant guardian in the absence of a closer one overrules the objection of the absent guardian. Implied consent is equivalent to explicit consent.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s consent is not considered, as it is a right granted by Sharia. As stated in Article (98), the husband’s right to reinstatement does not require the wife’s consent.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (17), if the closest guardian is absent and waiting for him would harm the bride’s interest, the right of guardianship transfers to the next in line. If consulting the next is impossible or he is unavailable, the right transfers to the judge.

In Rujʿah: The guardian’s absence has no effect.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (18), if a guardian wrongfully prevents (ʿAthl) [8] the marriage of a virgin who has reached 16 solar years of age, the judge may authorize her marriage upon request.

In Rujʿah: It is forbidden for a guardian to prevent the husband from reinstating his wife as long as she is in the waiting period.

In Nikāḥ: Article (19) distinguishes between a virgin (Bikr) and a non-virgin (Thayyib) regarding the requirement of guardian consent: "The consent of a guardian is not required for the marriage of a sane, non-virgin woman who has reached eighteen years of age."

In Rujʿah: Guardian consent is not required, whether the woman is a virgin or non-virgin.

In Nikāḥ: Under Article (20), the judge’s authorization for marriage per Article (18) is conditional on the dowry not being less than the standard dowry (Mahr Al-Mithl).

In Rujʿah: There is no dowry.

B. Regarding Witnessing (Ishhād):

Witnesses are not required for Rujʿah, whether by word or action. However, the majority of jurists—Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs (in the new opinion), and Aḥmad (in one narration)—recommend having two just witnesses and informing the wife to avoid disputes and enable proof in case of denial.

In Nikāḥ: There is consensus on the requirement of multiple witnesses. [9].

C. Regarding Consent (Riḍā):

The fundamental difference lies in the role of consent:

In Nikāḥ: Consent is essential. [10]

In Rujʿah: Consent is not considered [11]. If the wife or her guardian refuses her return to the husband, this refusal has no effect on the reinstatement. In contrast, lack of consent in Nikāḥ invalidates the contract.

D. Regarding Formulation (Ṣīghah):

Nikāḥ must be conducted with explicit words, such as "Nikāḥ" or "Tazwīj." Rujʿah may be effected by words or actions [12].

In Nikāḥ: The consent of the wife and her guardian (if she is a virgin) or her consent alone (if she is non-virgin) is required.

In Rujʿah: In the case of a revocable divorce, the consent of neither the wife nor her guardian is required [13].

In Nikāḥ: Witnesses are obligatory.

In Rujʿah: The law does not require witnesses and remains silent on the matter [14].

These differences highlight the essential distinctions between Nikāḥ and Rujʿah in the Jordanian Personal Status Law. Nikāḥ is a contract between a man and a woman that requires a guardian, witnesses, a formal offer and acceptance, and the consent of both parties. Rujʿah, on the other hand, is the reinstatement of the wife into her husband’s marital authority after a revocable divorce by his unilateral will. It does not require a guardian, witnesses, or the wife’s consent as long as she is in the waiting period.

________________________________________

References:

[1] ʿAbd Al-Ḥamīd, Aḥmad Mukhtār, et al. (1429 AH). Muʿjam Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabīyah Al-Muʿāṣirah (1st ed. /Vol.2/pp.860). ʿĀlam Al-Kutub.

[2] Qur’an, [Al-Baqarah/230].

[3] Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr Ibn Masʿūd. [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ Fī Tartīb Al-Sharāʾiʿ/Vol.2/pp.330].

[4] Al-Dasūqī, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad. [Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿAlā Al-Shariḥ Al-Kabīr/Vol.2/pp.415].

[5] Al-Shirbīnī. [Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj Ilā Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ Al-Minhāj/Vol.5/pp.3].

[6] Abū Al-Najā, Mūsā Ibn Aḥmad. [Al-Iqnāʿ Fī Fiqh/Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal/Vol.4/pp.560]. Ed. ʿAbd Al-Laṭīf Muḥammad Mūsā Al-Subkī. Dār Al-Maʿrifah.

[7] Jordanian Personal Status Law/Article/15.

[8] Definition of ʿAthl (prevention).

[9] Juristic references: Al-Kāsānī [Badāʾiʿ Al-Ṣanāʾiʿ; Al-Numayrī, Al-Kāfī Fī Fiqh Ahl Al-Madīnah]; Al-ʿĀṣimī, [Ḥāshiyat Al-Rawḍ Al-Murabbaʿ].

[10] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 16.

[11] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[12] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 7.

[13] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 98.

[14] Jordanian Personal Status Law, Article 8(A).

Article Number [ Previous | Next ]

Read for Author




Comments


Captcha


Warning: this window is not dedicated to receive religious questions, but to comment on topics published for the benefit of the site administrators—and not for publication. We are pleased to receive religious questions in the section "Send Your Question". So we apologize to readers for not answering any questions through this window of "Comments" for the sake of work organization. Thank you.




Summarized Fatawaa

"I told my family at night: 'I will fast tomorrow as qaḍā' (a make-up fast),' but I forgot to make the intention before sleeping. Is my fast valid?"

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
 
The intention is obligatory in acts of worship. For obligatory fasting, the required intention is to resolve to fast during the night [before dawn]. Its proper locus is the heart, while verbalizing the intention out loud in acts of worship is a sunnah — so that the tongue may align with the heart. If the intent behind the statement in question was the intention to fast, then it is valid; but if the intent was merely to inform someone, or reflected hesitation or doubt, then it is not valid.
 
It is stated in *Bushrā al-Karīm* (Vol.1/P.216): "It is a sunnah to verbalize the intention — that is, whatever has already been intended in the heart, whether an obligatory or a voluntary act — such as specifying the number of rak‘ahs, just before the opening takbīr — so that the tongue may assist the heart, and because this is further removed from whispered doubts (waswasah), and in order to accommodate the view of those who held it obligatory in every act of worship that requires an intention (even though this is a minority position), by analogy with Ḥajj."
 
Accordingly: if the intention to fast arose in your heart before the second adhān [i.e., before Fajr], then your fast is valid.
 
And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

Can Zakah or Zakat al-Fitr be given to a poor brother?

Yes, it is allowed to give Zakah or Zakat al-Fitr to a poor brother, as he is considered among the eligible recipients.

What is the ruling of Islamic Law on performing prayer on the upper floors of al-Masjid al-Ḥarām?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
Facing the actual structure of the Ka‘bah (‘ayn al-Ka‘bah) is one of the conditions for the validity of the prayer. The scholars have clarified what is meant by "the actual structure of the Ka‘bah."
Imam ash-Sharwānī (raḥimahullāh) said: "What is meant by its ‘ayn (actual structure) is its physical body, or the airspace directly aligned with it — if the person praying is not inside it. But if he is inside it, then the airspace alone does not suffice; rather, the actual physical structure must be faced, such that even if he faces a projecting part of it measuring roughly two-thirds of a dhirā‘ (cubit) or more, this would be sufficient." [Ḥāshiyat ash-Sharwānī ‘alā Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj, Vol.1/P.484]
Sheikh al-Qulyūbī (raḥimahullāh) said: "Unlike one who prays outside it — i.e., outside the Ka‘bah — for him the airspace (directly above it) suffices, even if he is higher than it, or even if he is at the location where it (hypothetically) has been demolished." [Ḥāshiyat al-Qulyūbī ‘alā Sharḥ al-Minhāj,  Vol.1/P.154]
Accordingly, the prayer is valid on the upper floors of al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, even though these floors are higher than the roof of the Ka‘bah itself. And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.

What is the ruling on waiving a debt owed by a debtor and counting it toward zakāh?

All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
Waiving a debt owed by a debtor, with the intention of counting it toward zakāh, does not fulfill the zakāh obligation. Rather, it constitutes an ordinary act of charity, for which Allah rewards the giver generously — since one of the conditions for the validity of zakāh is that the person paying it must form the intention of zakāh at the actual moment the wealth is paid out. In this case, the debt has already been established as a standing obligation upon the borrower, so it is not valid to simply redirect the intention toward zakāh after the fact.
It is preferable, instead, for the creditor to first collect the debt from the debtor, and then return to him the amount of money he is required to pay as zakāh — or a portion of it — if the debtor happens to fall under one of the eight categories that Allah, the Exalted, has commanded be given from zakāh.
It is stated in ‘Umdat as-Sālik, from the books of the Shāfi‘ī school: "If someone gives [money] to a poor person, stipulating that the recipient return it to him in payment of a debt owed to him, or says, 'I am making what you owe me into zakāh, so take it [as such]' — this is not valid. But if he gives it to him with the [unstated] intention that the recipient will use it to repay him, or says, 'Repay what you owe me, so that I may [then separately] give it to you as zakāh,' or the debtor himself says, 'Give it to me, so that I may [then] repay you with it' — this is valid, and there is no binding obligation for the recipient to actually fulfill this [informal understanding]." And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.