What is the ruling of Islamic Law on compensating the patient in case of medical error on the part of the treating physician?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
The foundational principle is that every mistake issued by a physician that causes harm to another due to his negligence or lack of expertise obligates him to guarantee liability and compensate the harmed party. The Sharia maxim, in this regard, states: "The direct actor is liable."
Ibn Qudamah (may Allah have mercy on him) says: "As for if he was skilled but his hand committed an error—such as exceeding the proper limit of incision, cutting in an incorrect site, cutting with an instrument that inflicts excessive pain, or cutting at an unsuitable time—he is liable, because it is destruction (Itlaf) whose liability does not differ between intent and mistake, thus resembling the destruction of property; and because it is a prohibited act, so he guarantees liability for its secondary effects." [Al-Mughni].
However, if the physician performed what was necessary in the most complete manner and took all measures of care and caution, but complications occurred that could not be avoided according to specialists, then no liability rests upon him.
Shaykh al-Islam Imam al-Nawawi (may Allah have mercy on him) says: "The cupper and the circumciser bear no liability if they have not been negligent, and likewise the veterinarian if he bleeds an animal and it perishes." [Rawdat al-Talibin].
Al-Khattabi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "I know of no disagreement that if the practitioner transgresses and the patient perishes, he is liable. Anyone who undertakes knowledge or practice he does not know is a transgressor; so if perishing arises from his action, he is liable for the blood-money (Diyah) while capital retaliation (Qisas) is dropped from him, because he did not act independently without the patient's permission. And the physician’s offense in the view of the generality of jurists is borne by his agnates ('Aqilah*)."* [Ma'alim al-Sunan].
If negligence or transgression is established against the physician, it is necessary to compensate the patient or seek forgiveness from him. And Allah Almighty knows best.
What is the ruling of Islamic Law on someone who wakes up in a state of janābah (major ritual impurity) near the very end of the prayer's designated time, during cold weather — should he heat water in order to perform ghusl, even though the prayer's time will expire as a result, or should he perform tayammum instead?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
If the water is cold, and cannot be used due to fear of harm that is not ordinarily tolerable, or that would result in illness, then in this case it becomes obligatory to heat the water — even if heating it causes the time for Fajr to expire — and no sin is incurred in doing so, due to his valid excuse. He may not resort to tayammum (dry ablution) instead, since water remains available [and merely needs to be heated].
Imam Shihāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad ar-Ramlī (raḥimahullāh) said: "He was asked regarding a person who, if he were to use cold water, would experience harm that permits tayammum, and who has access to something with which he could heat the water — but if he heats it, the prayer's time will expire. Is it obligatory for him to heat it even if the time expires, or should he pray with tayammum within the prescribed time? He answered that it is obligatory for him to heat the water, even if the time for that particular obligatory prayer expires." [Fatāwā ar-Ramlī, Vol.1/P.98]
Imam al-Bājūrī (raḥimahullāh) said in his Ḥāshiyah on Sharḥ Ibn Qāsim (Vol.1/P.173): "And if he fears [harm] from using cold water, and is currently unable to heat it, but knows of a place where firewood is available, such that if he were to go there he would not return until after the prescribed time has expired — what appears [to be the correct position] is that it is obligatory for him to go and seek the firewood, even if the time expires as a result, as this is the position ultimately settled upon by ar-Ramlī, and as related from him by Ibn Qāsim." And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.
What is the ruling on a woman who learns of her divorce or her husband's death after her *ʿiddah* has ended? And does the *ʿiddah* of a woman who abandoned mourning (*iḥdād*) for the whole period of the *ʿiddah*, or part of it, still end, even though she knew that abandoning it is forbidden?**
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah.
The waiting period of a widow who is not pregnant is four months and ten days, based on the saying of Allah Almighty (which means): “And those of you who die and leave wives behind, they shall wait concerning themselves for four months and ten days” [al-Baqarah/234]. If she is pregnant, her ʿiddah ends with the delivery of her child. The ʿiddah is calculated by lunar months and begins from the date of death.
If her ʿiddah ends before she learns of her husband’s death, or of his divorcing her, she does not observe the ʿiddah upon learning of it, because her ʿiddah has already ended.
It is stated in al-Bayān fī Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (Vol.11/p.41), one of the books of the Shāfiʿī school: “If a man divorces his wife, or dies while he is absent from her, her ʿiddah is from the time of the divorce or from the time of death. If she does not know of the divorce or the death until her ʿiddah period has ended, then her ʿiddah has ended. If she learns of it before the end of the ʿiddah period, she completes her ʿiddah counting from the time of the divorce or death.”
As for a woman who abandoned mourning throughout the ʿiddah while knowing that it is forbidden, she is sinful, although her ʿiddah has nonetheless ended. And Allah Almighty knows best.
What is the ruling on waiving a debt owed by a debtor and counting it toward zakāh?
All praise is due to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.
Waiving a debt owed by a debtor, with the intention of counting it toward zakāh, does not fulfill the zakāh obligation. Rather, it constitutes an ordinary act of charity, for which Allah rewards the giver generously — since one of the conditions for the validity of zakāh is that the person paying it must form the intention of zakāh at the actual moment the wealth is paid out. In this case, the debt has already been established as a standing obligation upon the borrower, so it is not valid to simply redirect the intention toward zakāh after the fact.
It is preferable, instead, for the creditor to first collect the debt from the debtor, and then return to him the amount of money he is required to pay as zakāh — or a portion of it — if the debtor happens to fall under one of the eight categories that Allah, the Exalted, has commanded be given from zakāh.
It is stated in ‘Umdat as-Sālik, from the books of the Shāfi‘ī school: "If someone gives [money] to a poor person, stipulating that the recipient return it to him in payment of a debt owed to him, or says, 'I am making what you owe me into zakāh, so take it [as such]' — this is not valid. But if he gives it to him with the [unstated] intention that the recipient will use it to repay him, or says, 'Repay what you owe me, so that I may [then separately] give it to you as zakāh,' or the debtor himself says, 'Give it to me, so that I may [then] repay you with it' — this is valid, and there is no binding obligation for the recipient to actually fulfill this [informal understanding]." And Allah, the Exalted, knows best.
